only be brought about with United States assistance, but at present there is an obvious reluctance on the part of the Americans to risk a further loss after their experience in China." "The United Kingdom in Southeast Asia and the Far East," Memorandum from Ernest Bevin, 18 October 1949, CP (49)207, CAB 129/37/1, NAUK. Richie Ovendale suggests that the U.S. administration was "wary" because it was "conscious that much of Asia was unconvinced of its devotion to peace, its lack of imperialistic ambition, and its interest in Asian freedom and progress." He also refers to American "naivety and selªshness" at this time. Richie Ovendale, "Britain, the United States, and the Cold War in SouthEast Asia, [1949] [1950] Britain 250,000-300,000 Malayan dollars a day. 12 In 1951 alone, the emergency cost the British government £69.8 million. 13 This is especially signiªcant when we consider the state of the British Exchequer in the late 1940s. World War II had drained the British economy to such an extent that it could scarcely meet existing commitments, let alone accept new ones. The very economic viability of the country seemed in doubt, especially during the "dollar gap" crisis of 1947. As one of Attlee's chief advisers wrote in December 1947: [W] e are a bankrupt nation. It will tax our strength and determination to the utmost during the next years to provide for our necessary imports by exports. Until we succeed we shall only keep alive through the charity of our friends. 14 In addition, exports in 1947-1948 had been crippled by a severe fuel crisis, the product of an unusually cold winter that gripped most of Europe. Fears of imminent economic depression were widespread. These problems arose at a time when government spending had been sharply increasing to create an elaborate welfare state. A vast program of state socialization in sectors ranging from coal mines to national health moved ahead, but the government's capacity to pay for its domestic legislation was in doubt. Austerity, far from being a mere catchphrase mouthed by British leaders to justify continued wartime rationing, was of crucial inºuence on diplomatic relations and strategic initiatives.
This economic imperative explains, in part, the relentless British pressure (especially throughout 1947) on the United States to commit itself to the ªght against Communism abroad. The Marshall Plan and the Berlin airlift testiªed to that commitment in Europe, but in Malaya the story was different. The U.S. refusal to help Britain in Malaya became evident on 22 June 1948, four days after the declaration of a state of emergency in the Malayan Federation, when the deputy commissioner of police for Malaya met with the U.S. consul in Kuala Lumpur to request assistance. Speciªcally, he wished to acquire ten thousand U.S. Army 30-caliber Winchester carbines and two million rounds of ammunition. These guns, he claimed, would be "ideal" for the special constabulary then being formed to counter the Communist insurgency but were unobtainable from the manufacturer. The consul declined to approve the request and instead simply recommended that the deputy commissioner contact the Malayan Chief Secretary. At a subsequent meeting the consul noted that the deputy commissioner had told him "despondently" that he was referring the matter to the British Colonial Ofªce. 15 The question that therefore arises-and is a core concern of this articleis why at this time of acute ªnancial difªculty, without crucial American support, the Labour government committed itself to a costly campaign in a colony whose demand for Merdeka (independence) seemed on the verge of being realized. 16 This article answers that question in three ways. First, it surveys and challenges contemporary and historical judgments concerning the origins of the Malayan Emergency. Second, it shows that these origins cannot be understood without recognizing the inºuence of indigenous pressures and internal developments that were more crucial than the role of the external Cold War dimension. The article thereby restores the agency of "local" actors. Third, it suggests that the MCP insurrection, far from being meticulously prepared and carefully coordinated as is often alleged, was inadequately planned and poorly executed. In line with other relatively recent interpretations, this article presents a more subtle and complex picture of the origins of the Malayan Emergency than many earlier studies have portrayed.
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Contemporary Assessments
The predominant explanation for both the origins of the insurgency and Britain's determination to defeat it, an explanation put forth at the time and, as we shall see, still accepted by commentators today, was the external threat of Communism posed by the Cold War. An ofªcial report, marked "secret" and written by the Director of Operations in Malaya, Lt. Gen. R. H. Bowen, summarized this view:
The Malayan Communist Party campaign is part of a wider Soviet-inspired drive to obtain control of what is strategically and economically one of the most important areas of South-East Asia. . . . In June 1948, on the instructions of the Cominform issued at two conferences in Calcutta four months earlier, the MCP started a campaign of murder, sabotage and terrorism designed to paralyse the Government and develop into armed revolution. 18 These assertions-of Soviet inspiration, Cold War expansionism, MCP initiation, and, signiªcantly, Calcutta as the conduit for instructions from the Soviet-led Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)-were echoed in various forms by the Attlee administration. When the British secretary of state for the colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, justiªed his authorization of the banning of the MCP and allied organizations in July 1948, he referred to the MCP as "the nerve centre of the whole subversive movement." 19 Both the Colonial Ofªce in October and the Cabinet Malaya Committee in November 1948 emphasized the "substantial grounds for regarding the Malayan outbreak as stimulated by Moscow" and the existence of a "Communist plot" to overthrow the Malayan government by armed force. 20 A lengthy memorandum prepared for the Cabinet by the permanent under-secretary of state in October 1949 warned of dangers that "will affect the whole security of SouthEast Asia" from "a powerful Communist Fifth Column, corroding from within." 21 Moscow's role was emphasized by the head of Security Intelligence, Far East, who warned that the Soviet Union in all likelihood controlled the growing local Communist parties in Southeast Asia. 22 The Soviet connection was also stressed by the government's Russia Committee: "The Soviet Legation at Bangkok was clearly designed to be the centre of Soviet activity in the whole of South East Asia and Soviet couriers passing through Singapore en route for the Far East or Australia were a constant source of danger." 23 One of these "couriers" was L.L. Sharkey, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA). After attending the Calcutta conferences, 24 Sharkey traveled to Singapore and, according to the Russia Committee, "played a considerable part in persuading the Malayan Communists to adopt a policy of violence." 25 Evidence to substantiate this allegation comes from Chin Peng, who recently wrote that "Sharkey's words [that in Australia, strike-breakers were murdered] had inspired us to the point that, as the meeting progressed to its ªnal stages, there emerged total commitment among those present for a toughening of our policy towards strikebreakers."
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The link between the September 1947 inaugural conference of the Cominform, which postulated the "two camp" thesis, the Calcutta meetings, and "the marked increase in Communist activity in South-East Asia immediately afterwards" was also endorsed by the South-East Asia Department of the Foreign Ofªce.
27 A top-secret joint memorandum submitted to the Cabinet defence committee by the minister of defence and the secretary of state for war located the Malayan Emergency in a wider context, arguing that strong armed action "against the guerrillas in Malaya is a vital step in the 'cold war' against Communism in the Far East. The Malayan campaign is not isolated and must be considered in relation to the Far East theatre as a whole."
28 Britain's chief intelligence ofªcer in Malaya, Major Harry Fisher, stretched the geographical context to include Europe. In a conversation with the U.S. consul in Kuala Lumpur, he suggested that the terrorist campaign "was merely one phase of a war which would soon break out in Europe over the Berlin situation." 29 The U.S. consul also reported that the Chief Secretary of Malaya, Sir Alexander Newboult, subscribed to the "rather widely held belief that Moscow is making a push in the East now that she seemed to be stopped temporarily in Europe." 30 Creech Jones expressed a similar view. "Once the path Such assessments were not conªned to private discussions, closed committee meetings, and top-secret memoranda. Residents of Malaya who owned radios were able to hear similar views expressed, albeit in a more extreme form, during a lengthy broadcast over Radio Malaya on the evening of 7 July 1948 titled "The Conºict in Malaya." 34 The language used during the broadcast by the recently appointed UK commissioner-general in Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, was often lurid, vitriolic, and morally charged, akin to the rhetoric then emanating from the Committee on Un-American Activities of the U.S. House of Representatives.
35 "It is the Communists," MacDonald declared, "who are now trying to impose upon you a vicious, tyrannical rule. . . . Our action will not cease until their wicked movement has been utterly destroyed." The aim of the Communists, he said, was "to establish gangster rule in Malaya," and therefore the British government would have to combat the MCP "until their power has been broken and they themselves are exterminated." 36 Only then would there be "safety for your homes." The "terrorist outbreak," according to MacDonald, "is part of a deliberate plan by the Malayan Communists to stage a violent revolution and capture the govern- ment of this country. That is a sober statement of fact." The broadcast was intended simultaneously to alert the populace to the gravity of the threat andby exhaustively outlining the harsh countermeasures that had been taken or were planned-to fortify and reassure listeners. Among those listening was the U.S. consul general in Singapore, Paul Josselyn, who told his superiors in Washington: "Do not consider MacDonald's accusation and warning exaggerated . . . public has frank statement difªculties confronting govt [sic] and its determination to suppress disorder." 37 Besides the desire to resist Communist expansion at the outset of the Cold War, another reason for Britain's decision to undertake a large military commitment at a time of ªscal pressures and resource constraints was the economic potential of the region. Once the Japanese were defeated in 1945, the British were determined to return to Malaya. This second colonial occupation occurred because of Malaya's dollar-earning capacity. As Creech Jones told the Cabinet (but not Parliament):
During 1947 the total value of the exports of Singapore and the [Malayan] Federation together was £151 million of which dollar exports accounted for £56 million. [Malaya] is by far the most important source of dollars in the colonial empire and it would gravely worsen the whole dollar balance of the Sterling Area if there were serious interference with Malayan exports.
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In 1948 the United States imported 727,000 tons of rubber, more than half of which came from Malaya. Of the 158,000 tons of tin imported by the United States, all but 3,000 came from Malaya. Measured in U.S. dollars, rubber shipments from Malaya exceeded in total value all domestic exports from Britain to the United States. From 1946 to 1950, Britain earned $700 million from rubber exports to the United States. 39 Any interruption of that supply by the insurgency would seriously impair the British economy. In 1948, Britain was still struggling to maintain the value of its currency, and the "dollar gap" seemed to be getting wider. This ªnancial crisis made earnings from the "Sterling Area," in which Malaya was the linchpin, all the more crucial. The security of British business in Malaya was therefore of central economic importance. 40 This economic motivation was not publicly empha- 
Retrospective Assessments
The "Communist plot" thesis, usually with its Cold War garb, became the prevalent interpretation of the Malayan Emergency. Intelligence Service-Records on Singapore and Malaya-Part 2," Item 13, A7133/3, NAA. The booklet's "tone," plus the fact that no author or publisher was listed, suggests that it emanated from the Information Research Department, a clandestine anti-Communist propaganda unit operating out of the British Foreign Ofªce but linked with and funded from the same source as MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service), which distributed unattributable material to select recipients.
facilitate "a major [Soviet] political offensive in Europe," particularly in the Balkans, Berlin, and Italy.
43 Donald Mackay concurs, arguing that after the Berlin airlift began in June 1948 the Soviet leader, Josif Stalin, was "in urgent need of some diversionary activity to deºect the attention of the Western powers." Consequently, the Soviet Union-the "Almer Mater of international revolution," as Mackay puts it-sent a "ªery cross" around the region with which it "set South East Asia alight." 44 Less evocatively, Frank Trager concludes that Calcutta was "the signal for the post-war re-entry of the Soviet Union into South and Southeast Asia," and Brian Crozier contends that all of the Southeast Asian insurrections of 1948 were "part of a pre-determined plan worked out in Moscow and Calcutta." 45 Richard Clutterbuck implies that the Calcutta conference is what sparked "armed revolution throughout Southeast Asia" and the "outbreak of rioting, sabotage and assassination in Malaya." 46 Robert Thompson expresses even greater certainty about this point: "In the case of Malaya, it is now known that instructions were received from Moscow" at Calcutta. The MCP, he maintains, "was a well-placed pawn which Russia could not fail to use, and if necessary sacriªce, in the cold-war period." 47 Other writers, who agree that MCP strategy was shaped by the international Communist movement, have maintained, albeit with little evidence, that the Chinese Communist Party, not the CPSU, was the driving force. 48 However, even the U.S. State Department at the time rejected this view. 49 Privately, several British ofªcials (though not the Secretary of State for War, Emanuel Shinwell), were also skeptical, as A. J. Stockwell has found.
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The MCP in the Post-1945 Era
The notion that Soviet instructions, transmitted in Calcutta, provoked armed uprisings in several Southeast Asian countries is questionable. As with many allegations of Communist plots, tangible evidence for this view (as opposed to the mere appearance of cause and effect), is extremely thin. A different interpretation of the origins of the Malayan Emergency emerges when we take account of the history of the MCP and the postwar conditions in Malaya.
Immigrant members of a leftwing faction of the Chinese Nationalists (the Guomindang) introduced Communism into Malaya in the 1920s. 51 After the expulsion of Communists from the Chinese mainland in 1927 and the abortive attempt by the Communist International's Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai to establish the Nanyang (South Seas) Communist Party, the MCP was formed in Singapore in early 1930. In the mid-1930s the party reorganized and gained control of sections of the labor movement, including its spearhead, the Malayan General Labour Union. Once the Sino-Japanese war began in 1937, the MCP formed an "anti-Japanese" united front within the Chinese community and established new cells in both urban and rural areas. Even so, the party lacked a mass base, and its support never extended into the predominant Malay population. 52 Following the Japanese invasion of Malaya in 1942, the MCP established the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) and began to receive arms, ammunition, and guerrilla training from the British. 53 The MCP set up a military wing that gained valuable experience in guerrilla ªghting-a wing that was revived in 1948. The MCP emerged from the war stronger and with greater support, tarnished only by the savage justice meted out by the MPAJA to alleged collaborators and traitors after peremptory mass "trials." At the end of the war, the 23-year-old Chin Peng, who headed the illegal MCP during the entire period of the emergency, marched in a victory parade in Singapore and was awarded the prestigious Order of the British Empire. 56 This hard-won success became pyrrhic when the leadership of the party disintegrated. This internal crisis was a central reason for the MCP's decision to abandon peaceful agitation in favor of armed struggle.
On 3 March 1947, on the eve of a specially convened MCP Central Committee meeting, Lai Tek disappeared and was never seen again. 57 He took with him not only his vast knowledge of the MCP's infrastructure but also the bulk of the party's considerable funds. 58 Evidence later emerged that he had 54. He never actually received this decoration because it was annulled after it arrived from London at the outset of the Malayan Emergency. For Chin Peng's biographical details, see Gene Z. 55. However, the MCP retained or buried a signiªcant cache of arms, some of which had been abandoned by the British at the start of the war and others that had been obtained from the Japanese at the end of the war. The MCP also withheld about twenty percent of the wartime drops of arms it had received from the British. All of these weapons were redeployed during the Malayan Emergency.
56. This was assisted by widespread economic grievances in the immediate postwar years. In 1946 basic wages had been ªxed at prewar scales while the cost of living was 300 percent higher than in the prewar period. Housing was characterized by high rents, short supply, and overcrowding. Ofªcial food rations were inadequate, and the cost of rice on the black market was exorbitant. 57. For a thorough account of the strange case of "Mr. Wright," see Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948 Malaya -1960 been a triple agent working for the British Special Branch in Singapore both before and after World War II and collaborating with the Japanese Kempeitai intelligence service during the war. 59 His betrayal seriously compromised the MCP. The information he supplied led, for example, to the "Batu Caves massacre" in September 1942, when a large number of senior party members were captured and beheaded by the Japanese. The information turned over by Lai Tek also resulted in the capture of large supply and ammunition dumps by the Selangor police in February 1947, just weeks before his defection. 60 Although Chin Peng immediately assumed leadership of the MCP, the fallout from the Lai Tek affair was enormous. The party took at least twelve months to recover. 61 The paralysis of the MCP during this period has been documented by others and will not be detailed here. 62 What is important, for this article, is that after the MCP rank-and-ªle learned about Lai Tek's defection, Chin Peng came under strong pressure to repudiate the policies of his discredited patron. These policies, as noted earlier, had been moderate: Lai Tek was the architect of postwar cooperation with the British and peaceful penetration of student and worker organizations. "But for him," noted a British intelligence report in 1948, "an attempt would have been made in 1945 or 1946 to organise a more militant campaign by the Communists."
63 His presence had been a powerful barrier to aggressive militancy. Moreover, Lai Tek's removal of actual or potential rivals, combined with the information he turned over in his role as triple agent, resulted in the elimination of Communist leaders in the all-important party center in Singapore. The leadership structure in the wake of his defection was characterized by youth, inexperience, and a lack of discipline. The more radical middle-level cadres, who had taken part in the wartime resistance and were committed to the ideals of the MPAJA, were in the ascendance. Their demands to resort to violent insurrection found increasingly receptive ears within the MCP hierarchy. All of this was at least six months before the Calcutta conferences.
Another purely internal factor-the interplay between labor unrest and colonial repression-also contributed to the MCP's adoption of a more militant posture. Although labor-industrial relations in postwar Malaya were highly complex and varied by class, race, and region, certain patterns can be discerned. 64 First, the old-style paternalism of the interwar years had dissipated. One of the most regulated labor regimes in the British Empire had been abruptly dismantled in 1942. The immediate postwar period, when the labor market was in disarray, found a workforce less compliant and more independent. Chinese contract workers, who were less bonded to their employers and more mobile, were no longer willing to tolerate exorbitant charges for the necessities of life. Employers bristled at this erosion of labor control, which gave rise to rebelliousness and the rapid growth of unionism.
Second, the popularity, resources, and scale of the General Labour Union, renamed the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU) in late 1946, were-by prewar standards-immense. The activities of the PMFTU were wide-ranging (sponsoring schools, overseeing small businesses, conducting industrial negotiations) and its membership base diverse (itinerant workers, rickshaw drivers, small-scale vendors, contracting gangs, craft guilds, and others). By April 1947, PMFTU membership was 263,598, or more than 50 percent of the total workforce. The union was legal, constitutional, and militant-and it was controlled by the MCP. 65 In April 1946 the government of the Malayan Union, anxious to restore stability to a restless workforce and an unsettled economy but also hoping to break centralized Communist control of the trade union movement, introduced the Trade Unions Ordinance requiring the supervision and registration of all trade unions. This restrictive policy remained in force until early 1948 and was the prelude to the end of the PMFTU. Although the PMFTU had organized a successful general strike on 29-30 January 1946, it backed away from open conºict in the face of Britain's superior strength and resolve. Undoubtedly, the "moderate" hand of Lai Tek also played a role. But some MCP activists were dissatisªed with the union's lack of revolutionary fervor, and their frustration was compounded by the leadership crisis of March 1947 when a strike wave was engulªng the country. In the twelve months from April 1947, 512,000 workdays were lost in Malaya and 205,000 in Singapore. 66 Many were wildcat strikes initiated without ofªcial authorization, and they ebbed and ºowed with ºuctuations in the labor market. The sources of this industrial unrest were complex and need not concern us here. Sufªce it to say that the strike wave was symptomatic of pressure from below that both emboldened and propelled the MCP to adopt a more militant, revolutionary stance. Third, the response of employers was unyielding and their actions draconian. They rued the erosion of their paternalistic "rights" over the workforce and feared the growing power of the Communist-dominated union movement. To bolster productivity and proªt margins during a difªcult period of postwar reconstruction, they were intent on restoring stability and order. Their crackdown on labor organizations was assisted-cautiously and perfunctorily in 1945-1946 and more earnestly in 1947-1948-by the colonial administration. The interests of state and business coincided insofar as each was committed to restoring business conªdence and curbing the politicization of industrial unrest. 67 Prior to the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency, the employers took the lead in attempting to reimpose discipline. They formed new associations such as the Malayan Planting Industry Employers' Association and the Malayan Mining Employers' Association, the former of which recommended ºogging, banishment, and even execution for "vicious malcontents," "agitators," and other "subversive elements" who masqueraded as adherents of a "utopian political faith." 68 As the price of rubber dropped in the winter of 1947, the employers dismissed workers and used eviction orders to expel labor activists from their plantations. In mid-1947, during strikes in Kedah sparked by a substantial wage cut, the planters insisted that they would negotiate only with contractors, not with unions. Some introduced their own employment regulations that severely circumscribed union activity. Many employers dismissed union "agitators" and replaced them with non-unionized "scab" workers. The union activists, for their part, engaged in ruthless picket action and violent intimidation of strikebreakers. They threatened the lives of managers and occasionally made good on their threats, prompting managers to evacuate their families to Penang. For many Britons, the terror was actual as well as implied. Militant activity, inºamed by evictions and growing unemployment, was especially evident in the Sungei Siput area in Perak. It was here
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Deery 67. The extent to which Whitehall and, in particular, the Colonial Ofªce supported employers' demands and collaborated with and protected commercial interests in Malaya even as it accepted the argument of a "Communist plot" is a subject of debate. The best analysis of this issue concludes that the Attlee government regarded British employers' claims as alarmist and self-interested. Moreover, government and business never worked hand-in glove, as alleged. Rather, the government often viewed business with indifference. The Labour government provided protection to ensure that Malaya's dollar-earning capacity was maintained, not to defend the interests of rubber and tin companies. in June 1948 that the murders of three rubber plantation managers triggered the State of Emergency. 69 The insurrection in Malaya needs to be seen within this broader domestic context. Three factors were especially important: an unyielding, repressive, and more uniªed body of estate and mine owners increasingly assisted by local authorities, security forces, and police; a less malleable, more militant, and better organized but still restless workforce; and endemic anxiety and violence on the rural frontier. 70 The MCP was aware of the ªrst factor, was inºuenced by the second, and saw opportunities in the third. From early 1947 on these factors converged, and in May-June 1948 they collided. Although the MCP fell into disarray in the aftermath of the Lai Tek affair, the new leaders of the party were poised to rekindle revolutionary fervor. The MCP was losing its grassroots support in urban areas largely because of the assault on its key "front" organizations by the colonial government, which was taking tough action to curb unrest and restore stability. 71 The party's strength in rural areas, amid pervasive rivalries and conºicts between individual estate unions, was limited and undependable. 72 The MCP therefore embarked on a revolt for which it was ill-prepared. But its options were few-either jail or the jungle. None of these developments was determined by factors external to Malaya, contrary to the still-widespread view that the revolt occurred only because the MCP received Soviet "instructions" to that effect at the Calcutta conferences of February-March 1948. The international dimension of the crisis is the subject to which we now turn.
Cominform, Calcutta, and Sharkey
Although it is an overstatement to say that the MCP had "little, if any, connexion with the outside world," 73 the party had always been on the mar-gins of the international Communist movement. The records of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), especially its Political Committee and Executive Committee, contain only ºeeting references to "The Situation in Malaya"-a surprising gap in light of Malaya's importance to the British empire. 74 The paucity of the MCP's links with other Communist parties also was evident in the discussions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), a party more geographically proximate. 75 Nonetheless, despite the MCP's comparative isolation, Malayan Communists undoubtedly were aware of the highly publicized keynote speech by Andrei Zhdanov, a leading Soviet ofªcial, to the inaugural conference of the Cominform in the Polish town of Szklarska Poremba in September 1947. 76 The most famous aspect of his report was that the world was divided into "two camps"-a peace-loving, progressive camp led by the Soviet Union and a war-mongering, imperialist camp led by the United States. 77 Zhdanov had Europe, not Asia, in his sights. Because he was seeking to give the "required rigidity to the future structure of the Soviet sphere of inºuence in Eastern Europe;" his speech said much about Yugoslavia and little about the colonies in Asia and Africa. 78 Even so, the speech marked the beginning of an aggressive, militant line faithfully adopted by the world's Communist parties. This new approach, reminiscent of the Comintern's "class-against-class" offensive in 1929-1932, lasted until the early 1950s; it was doctrinaire in analysis, unrealistic in expectations, self-delusory and, ultimately, self-defeating. It also formed part of the backdrop to Calcutta.
The extent to which the two Calcutta conferences acted as transmission belts of the Cominform "two camp" doctrine to Southeast Asia is hard to determine with any precision. Undoubtedly the new militant line was promoted for the region. Colonial regimes backed by the French, Dutch, and British were slotted into the pro-imperialist camp; the united front was jettisoned; and "neutral" nationalism and all forms of class cooperation were denounced. The conference stipulated that anti-colonial struggles must be led exclusively by Communists. Only the ªrst conference-the one organized jointly by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students-was attended by a Malayan delegate, the relatively junior Li Siong, who was president of the Malayan New Democratic Youth League, an MCP front organization. 79 Apparently, he was chosen because of his good command of English, but he was an ineffective intermediary for the Cominform. He did not arrive back in Singapore until 22 March 1948, well after the crucial 4th Plenum of the MCP. 80 In the only systematic analysis of the ªrst Calcutta conference, Ruth McVey argues that the main point made by the conference-that there could be no compromise in the struggle against imperialism-could have led easily to the conclusion that the only remaining path was that of armed struggle. . . . [T]he militant tone displayed by the Calcutta Conference may well have given encouragement and added prestige to the more extreme elements among the Southeast Asian Communists. Later . . . they could look on the conference's declarations as an ideological justiªcation for their decisions to try the way of violence. 81 The conclusions drawn by the MCP and the justiªcations provided by the conference must, however, be delineated from causal connections. Despite the near simultaneity and alleged synchronicity of rebellions in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the impact of Calcutta was far from uniform. The conference had its greatest impact on the Burmese delegates and the least effect on the "most unsympathetic," non-Communist Filipino delegation.
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McVey emphasizes the absence of any documentary evidence of the promulgation or passing of secret instructions at the conference, the unsuitability of such a broad-based conference for the transmission of highly conªdential directives, and the existence of internal conditions that had already stoked rebellious inclinations within the Southeast Asian Communist parties. She concludes:
The opportunity and incentive for Communist rebellion were already present in the countries where revolt occurred. It thus does not seem likely that the twocamp message lit the revolutionary spark in Southeast Asia, though it may well have added extra tinder which caused it to burn into ºame. 83 In relation to Malaya, therefore, it would appear that by March 1948 the MCP was cognizant of, and perhaps fortiªed by, the Zhdanov line and the revolutionary ªres burning in neighboring countries, especially China and Indochina. But there is little evidence that the MCP's strategy was dictated by the CPSU or that-as Brimmell alleges-"Moscow's instructions were adopted." 84 Rather, a conjunction emerged between international trends and domestic pressures. The lessons from outside were consistent with developments inside Malaya.
What about the role of Lance Sharkey, the general secretary of the Australian Communist Party, who is presumed to have been a Soviet emissary? Once again there is no extant documentary evidence regarding the secret discussions Sharkey held with the leaders of the MCP during his two-week "stopover" in Singapore on his way home to Sydney after attending both Calcutta conferences. 85 Certainly Sharkey, far more than his counterpart in London, Harry Pollitt, found the tough, doctrinaire line very congenial. 86 He was a dedicated Stalinist who had been trained in Moscow and installed by the Comintern as leader of the CPA in 1929. In that capacity, he carried immense authority. 87 But ideological support and verbal encouragement of anti-colonial struggle are not the same as carrying instructions "on behalf of Stalin."
88 Although Chin Peng may not be a reliable source, his reminiscences in 1999-some ªfty years after the events-underscore the need for caution in weighing the role of Sharkey. Chin Peng acknowledged that Sharkey inºuenced the MCP's tactics and that the Australian's visit was "inspiring," but he insisted unequivocally that Sharkey did not determine the MCP's strategy. 89 The inference one might draw is that Sharkey gave advice, clariªcation, and his imprimatur but left the question of a Malayan uprising to local decision. 90 If so, one of the central props of the traditional interpretation-the notion that the MCP was ordered into the jungle as part of an Asian revolutionary strategy developed in Moscow, set in motion at Calcutta, and dictated by Sharkey in Singaporecollapses.
Countdown to Insurrection?
Even allowing for the absence of external direction in the events of mid-1948, did a clearly formulated plan for revolt exist? Were the murders at Sungei Siput part of this plan? Did the MCP decide on insurrection at some point? The received wisdom suggests that the MCP did indeed plan the action well in advance. Gene Hanrahan asserts that once the "strategic doctrines and tactical directives [were] laid out," MCP leaders launched "their plan of chaos." 91 Lucian Pye refers to "a coordinated plan"; Edgar O'Ballance to a "mapped out programme"; Harry Miller to a "blueprint for victory"; J. H. Brimmell to a "fateful decision"; Charles McLane to a "plan of struggle"; Richard Clutterbuck to "launching the armed struggle"; Robert Jackson to a "carefully orchestrated" offensive; and Victor Purcell to "central planning and direction" by "a Central Bureau in close touch with the Central Executive Committee."
92 These judgments were consistent with Malcolm MacDonald's "sober statement of fact" that the "present terrorist outbreak" was "part of a deliberate plan" to stage revolution and capture government. 93 Thus, with only a few exceptions, the accepted interpretation in Malayan Emergency historiography assumes centralized planning and coordinated decision-making. 94 Interestingly, one of the few observers in Malaya itself, who was more circumspect than those to whom he spoke, was the U.S. consul, William Blue. Separating conjecture from conªrmation, he wrote that he had "as yet seen no documentary proof that the present campaign against the Government is 'Communistinspired' as the [British] authorities describe it." 95 The "documentary proof " cited in the literature on the Malayan Emergency is usually the three resolutions of the 4th Plenum of the MCP Central Committee, which met in Singapore from 17 to 21 March 1948. Sharkey was among those who spoke at the plenum. One of the resolutions adopted at the plenum emphasized the need to restore party discipline in the wake of the Lai Tek defection. The two other resolutions were more fundamental. One stated that the ªght for independence from British imperialism must ultimately take the form of a "people's revolutionary war," and the other called on "the masses" to prepare themselves for "an uncompromising struggle for independence without regard to considerations of legality." 96 The resolutions were about intentions. They emphasized the need to prepare for a rebellion. The militancy of the 4th Plenum was less a turning point than a benchmark along a path on which the MCP had been moving since 1947. 97 Clarity, discipline, and coordination, as well as an explicit revolutionary program-normally the sine qua non of successful insurrection-were absent. In retrospect, it appears that the MCP anticipated a lengthy period of increasingly combative activity in which both legal and illegal tactics would be employed. The ruthlessness of the British response-ªrst in outlawing the all-important PMFTU, then in introducing the draconian State of Emergency regulations-was unexpected. 97. The rapidly ascendant militant wing and the increasingly restless rank-and-ªle had become disillusioned with the united-front strategy. By 1948 the MCP leaders who were wary of armed struggle had been marginalized.
The timing of the State of Emergency clearly took the MCP by surprise. 98 Consequently, the party's decision to go underground was ad hoc; its retreat to the jungles was made in panic; and its switch from urban to rural revolt was confused. These moves left the MCP's "front" organizations off balance, leaderless, and isolated. In this sense, the decision to mobilize for guerrilla warfare was accelerated by, and partly in response to, the severity of government action in May-June 1948. The notion that the MCP was following a carefully planned strategy-a strategy coordinated by a highly centralized party structure-is fallacious. By all indications, the murders of the three European planters at Sungei Siput on 16 June were not authorized or sanctioned by MCP leaders but carried out instead by a local Communist guerrilla unit acting on its own initiative. 99 The inchoate nature of the insurgency was conªrmed by Malcolm MacDonald, who had been perhaps the strongest and most persuasive voice behind the British Cabinet's decision in July 1948 to outlaw the MCP. On 14 October, he briefed a top-secret meeting in London of the government's Russia Committee. His assessment, unintentionally, casts doubt on entrenched historical judgments and provides a revealing look at the MCP's weaknesses. He stated that the Malayan Communists had failed because they had not been extreme enough. Murder on a larger scale and sabotage of railways, mines and broadcasting stations might have been very successful. . . . [But] the Communists were, in fact, amateurs drawn from the ranks of unskilled Chinese bandits (not Moscow-trained revolutionaries) and had not possessed the determination required to carry out such an ambitious plan. . . . They had never been able to set up a central control of the insurrection. . . . [A]rms and ammunition were running short and there were no fresh supplies of ammunition or recruits reaching the insurgents from outside the country. 100 MacDonald believed that if British military operations had occurred on open terrain rather than the jungle, "six weeks would have been sufªcient" to defeat the uprising. Although he did not provide the Committee with a timeline for success, the tenor of his remarks conveyed optimism: "At present British forces were engaged in exterminating them [the MCP] in isolated groups." 101 them off we have got to have a large military effort . . . and an equally large police and administrative and political effort." 107 The counterinsurgency employed a range of strategies and fought on a number of fronts. Four components of the strategy are worth highlighting. First, a "hearts and minds" campaign, adapted to local conditions, was initiated by General Sir Gerald Templer, the British High Commissioner from February 1952. 108 This campaign severed the umbilical cord between the MCP and its sources of food, recruitment, and intelligence. The insurgents, once isolated from their support base, were far more vulnerable to British military operations. Second, Britain launched a major "population control" effort involving the relocation of more than 50,000 Chinese "squatters," the creation of nearly 450 "New Villages," and the mass deportations of detainees. 109 Third, the British and Australians reªned their aerial warfare by dropping "safe conduct" passes accompanied by seductive promises of monetary rewards to encourage or accelerate defections. Aerial drops of millions of "strategic" leaºets, including handwritten letters and photographs from surrendered guerrillas, were used in conjunction with "voice-aircraft" to personalize propaganda. 110 British and Australian planes also dropped 1,000-pound bombs, chemical defoliants, and napalm on or near jungle camps. 111 Fourth, the British developed an efªcient, synchronized intelligence apparatus by restructuring the Special Branch and giving it a large budget to pay informers. Sophisticated "black" propaganda and psychological operations were coordinated by Hugh Carlton Greene, MI6, and the Information Research Department from Phoenix Park (Commissioner-General
